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1 Introduction
Shares in initial public offerings (IPOs) are in general sold at a fixed price, which is set after
marketing the issue to investors and recording their demand.1 Despite the prior interaction with
investors, the offer price typically generates a sizeable first-day return—the standard measure of
underpricing. Over the period 1980-2015, the first-day return in US IPOs averaged 18%, leaving
substantial profits for investors participating in the offering.2
There is a number of alternative explanations for the underpricing in IPOs, ranging from asym-
metric information to investor sentiment and conflicts of interests within integrated investment
banks.3 Benveniste and Spindt (1989) provide an information-based explanation for the underpric-
ing. In their model, investors receive underpriced shares in return for truthfully revealing their
demand during the book building preceding the offering, allowing the underwriter to set a price
that maximizes the issuer’s proceeds. Their argument receives strong empirical support beginning
with Hanley (1993). She shows that the initial return is increasing in the revision of the offer price
from the mid-point of the pricing range indicated in the prospectus. It is as if investors’ information
is not fully priced—an empirical regularity known as the “partial adjustment” phenomenon.
While it may be rational to compensate investors for private information that helps increase the
precision of the offer price, there is substantial evidence that public information also affects IPO
underpricing. As shown by Loughran and Ritter (2002) and Lowry and Schwert (2004), the higher
the market return leading up to the offering, the greater is the underpricing.4 This predictability
of initial returns is puzzling since the public information is freely available to the underwriter
and should be fully incorporated into the offer price. The extant literature has attacked this
puzzle by assuming irrational behavior (Loughran and Ritter, 2002; Derrien, 2005) or an exogenous
correlation between the state of the economy and the expected value of the issuer’s shares to the
investor (Edelen and Kadlec, 2005; Sherman, 2005). Furthermore, Leite (2007) demonstrates that
public information affects the winners curse problem in the issue and in turn the issuers pricing
decision.
1The auction method, most spectacularly used by Google in 2004, is an exception (Derrien and Womack, 2003;
Lowry, Officer, and Schwert, 2010).
2Source: Jay Ritter at http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm
3See, e.g., Ljungqvist (2007) for a comprehensive survey of the empirical IPO underpricing literature.
4See also Logue (1973), Bradley and Jordan (2002), Benveniste, Ljungqvist, Wilhelm, and Yu (2003), Ince (2014)
and Kutsuna, Smith, and Smith (2009).
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Our contribution is twofold. First, we endogenously derive the correlation between the public
signal and the IPO underpricing in a model that preserves the information-based intuition of the
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) framework. The key assumption is that the public and private signals
are informative about the issuing firm’s value, which in a rational Bayesian equilibrium generates
a conditional correlation between the signals. Second, we perform large-sample tests of the model
and find strong empirical support for its predictions.
In our model, the public information affects the equilibrium underpricing through two channels:
investor demand for allocations and investor incentives to truthfully reveal their private information.
We refer to the first channel as the demand effect of the public signal. Intuitively, since the public
and private signals are conditionally correlated, the public information affects the distribution
of investors’ private signals and thus their demand for share allocations. Specifically, a positive
(negative) public signal is associated with a higher (lower) likelihood of sufficient investor demand
to generate underpricing.
The second channel through which the public signal affects underpricing is what we label the
incentive effect: the conditional initial return necessary to induce investors to truthfully reveal their
private signal. This channel is new to the literature and unique to our model. As in Benveniste and
Spindt (1989), investors may misrepresent their information in an attempt to lower the offer price.
However, the underwriter optimally allocates shares to investors reporting positive information
and strategic false reporting may cut the investor’s allocation. The likelihood that an untruthful
investor receives shares in the issue depends on the public signal: it is lower (higher) for a positive
(negative) signal, reducing (increasing) the incentives to report falsely. The public signal also affects
the expected aftermarket value of the firm, where a positive (negative) signal reduces (increases)
the marginal informational value of the private signal. Thus, to induce investors to truthfully reveal
their signals, the underwriter must, ceteris paribus, underprice the issue less (more) when the public
signal is positive (negative).
Through the demand effect and the incentive effect, the public signal has both a positive and
a negative effect on the expected underpricing. The ultimate impact of the public signal depends
on the relative magnitude of the two channels. In our setting, the informational value of a private
signal is declining in the number of investors participating in the offering. Thus, when the number
of investors is sufficiently large, the demand effect dominates the incentive effect and the expected
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underpricing is positively related to the public information, consistent with extant evidence.
We test our model in a sample of 6,300 US IPOs in the period 1983 to 2012. To correct for
any potential truncation of the initial returns caused by withdrawn offerings, we follow Edelen and
Kadlec (2005) and use a two-step Heckman (1979) procedure. A unique and central implication of
the model is that investors require higher conditional initial returns to truthfully report their private
information in falling markets than in rising markets. We test this by regressing the initial IPO
return on an interaction term between the private information and a dummy variable indicating
that the return on the S&P500 index leading up to the issue is positive. To capture investor private
information, we use the revision in the final offer price from the initial pricing range mid-point,
orthogonalized to the S&P500 index to purge any effect of the market return on the offer price
revision.
Cross-sectional regressions produce a negative and highly significant coefficient for the key
interaction term. That is, the initial return associated with an offer price revision is lower when
the market return is positive than when it is negative, as predicted by the model. This finding
is new to the empirical literature and consistent with the incentive effect. The result is robust to
the inclusion of standard control variables and the correction for self-selection, which in itself lacks
statistical significance.
Like Benveniste and Spindt (1989), our model holds that investor bids contain private in-
formation about issuer valuation. Following Wang and Yung (2011), who show that the partial
adjustment phenomenon is concentrated to top-tier underwriters, we split the sample according to
underwriter rank. Importantly, the interaction term for the incentive effect is highly significant only
in the subsample of top-tier underwriters, where the order book is held to be most informative.5
Moreover, after controlling for the incentive effect, the correlation between the first-day return and
the pre-issue market return disappears, hence resolving the puzzling predictability of initial returns.
For completeness, we also show that the implications of the demand effect hold in the data. As
expected, the likelihood that the initial return is positive increases with the stock market return
during the book building process. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we set up the model. Section 3 discusses the relation between public information and expected
underpricing, as well as the key assumptions of the model. In Section 4, we describe the sample
5See, e.g., Ljungqvist (2007) and Jenkinson and Jones (2004).
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and report the results from our empirical tests. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are found in
Appendix A.
2 The model
2.1 The information structure
We start with a firm that is about to offer its shares to outside investors through an IPO. The true
value of the firm is high G with probability α and low B with probability 1− α, where G > B. To
simplify the exposition, and with no loss of insight, we let G = 1 and B = 0. We also normalize
the number of shares to be floated to one. All agents are risk neutral and the risk-free interest rate
is zero.
There are N ≥ 2 investors participating in the offering. Each investor i = 1, . . . , N observes at
a zero cost a private signal si = {gi, bi}, where gi represents positive and bi negative information
about the firm. We may think of these investors as the underwriter’s regular pool of investors
and the signal si as their unique knowledge about the firm as well as information about their own
demand and liquidity.6 Let n ∈ {0, 1, ..., N} denote the number of investors that observe positive
private signals. The precision in the private signal si is the same across all investors and equals
γ = q(gi|G) = q(bi|B), where q(·|·) and q(·) denote conditional and unconditional probabilities
throughout. We let γ > 1/2 to make the signal informative about the true value of the firm, so
that q(G|gi) > q(G) > q(G|bi).
Moreover, all investors observe a common public signal s = {g, b}, where g represents positive
and b negative information. The precision in the public signal is given by µ = q(g|G) = q(b|B),
where µ > 1/2 and so it is informative. We can think of the public signal as market-wide informa-
tion, such as changes in aggregate demand or the business cycle, which affects the value of the firm.
In the empirical analysis below, we use the stock market return during the book-building process
as a proxy for the public signal.
We further assume that the signals, or more precisely the error terms, are uncorrelated con-
6Alternatively, one could assume that investors’ private signals are costly and that the underwriter is able to
distinguish informed from uninformed investors, and will allow only informed investors to participate in the book-
building process. If now the underwriter is unable to commit to compensate investors for their informational costs,
then the number N of investors in the offering will be determined endogenously from their incentive constraint and
the pricing of the issue will be the same as under our zero-cost assumption.
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ditional on the true value of the firm, so that q(gi, g|G) = q(gi|G) q(g|G) and q(gi, g|B) =
q(gi|B) q(g|B).7 By Bayes’ rule, these assumptions yield the following result:
Lemma 1 The probability that an investor’s private signal si is positive (negative) is higher if the
public signal s is positive (negative) than if it is negative (positive); in other words, q(gi|g) > q(gi|b)
and q(bi|b) > q(bi|g).
Lemma 1 implies that the distribution of investors’ private signals will depend on the realization
of the public signal. The positive conditional correlation follows directly from the assumption that
the signals are informative about the true value of the firm.8
Let v(n, s) denote the market value of the firm after it is publicly listed for a given number of
positive private signals n. The aftermarket value is assumed to fully reflect all available information
at the time of the offering. That is, v(n, s) is the expected value of the firm conditional on the
n positive private signals observed by investors and the public signal s, and hence, ∂v/∂n > 0.
With v(n, s) as a conditional expectation, the marginal impact of each investor’s private signal on
the firm’s aftermarket value is decreasing in the number N of investors in the offering. Because
the aftermarket value of the firm increases with the number of positive private signals, n is also a
measure of the demand for shares in the issue, with a higher n corresponding to higher demand.
2.2 The optimal pricing and allocation rule
The book-building process is run by an underwriter, whose services are free of charge. The un-
derwriter declares a pricing and allocation rule that maximizes the proceeds to the issuer. After
observing the public and private signals, investors report their signal by placing a “high” or “low”
bid. In equilibrium, all investors truthfully report their signals. Thus, when the underwriter sets
the offer price at the end of the book-building process, he correctly anticipates the firm’s value
v(n, s) in the aftermarket.
We assume that the underwriter is constrained to allocate at most a fraction 1/n̄ of the issue
to one investor. As a result, the issue must be distributed to at least n̄ investors, where 0 <
7Using the normal distribution as a reference point, our informational assumptions are akin to having the true
value of the firm V be normally distributed with some mean V̄ and variance σ2V and letting each investor i observe
a signal si = V + εi, where εi has a zero mean, cov(εi, εj) = 0 for i 6= j, and cov(si, sj) = σ2V > 0. Similarly, for a
public signal s = V + εp, it will be the case that cov(εi, εp) = 0, and cov(si, s) = σ
2
V .
8That is, q(gi|G) > 1/2, q(g|G) > 1/2, q(bi|B) > 1/2, and q(b|B) > 1/2.
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n̄ ≤ N . Since all private signals have the same precision, investors with identical bids receive
equal allocations. A central insight of Benveniste and Spindt (1989) is that, to maximize expected
proceeds, it is optimal to maximize (minimize) the fraction of the issue allocated to investors who
submit high (low) bids. This implies that investors bidding low will be allocated shares only if the
number n of investors placing high bids falls below n̄. Hence, if n ≥ n̄, investors submitting high
bids will each receive zH(n) ≡ 1/n of the issue. If instead n < n̄, investors bidding high will each
receive 1/n̄ of the issue and investors who bid low will each receive zL(n) ≡
(
1
N−n
)(
1− nn̄
)
.
Let pH(n, s) denote the offer price when n ∈ [n̄, N ], so the issue is allocated exclusively to
investors submitting high bids. Let further pL(n, s) denote the offer price when n ∈ [0, n̄), i.e., the
states in which a fraction 1− nn̄ of the issue is allocated to investors with low bids. We refer to the
pricing for the former as an upward revision in the offer price (relative to the initial range) and
that of the latter as a downward revision. We assume that the underwriter is committed to price
the issue so that it is never overpriced in expectation.
Let us next consider investors’ incentives to truthfully reveal their private signals. An investor
with a bad signal has a negative expected payoff from submitting a high bid and therefore no
incentive to report falsely. Instead, we need to worry about the incentives of investors with positive
private signals. These investors may benefit from falsely reporting their signals as negative in order
to lower the issue price. Indeed, this possibility ensures that investors with good information earn
strictly positive informational rents in the IPO. The underwriter prices and allocates the issue to
minimize the informational rents of these investors, while at the same time inducing them to report
truthfully.
The expected payoff to an investor i with a positive private signal gi from submitting a low bid
is equal to
ÛL(s) =
n̄−1∑
n=0
zL(n) q̂(n|gi, s) [v(n̂+ 1, s)− pL(n̂, s)]
=
n̄−1∑
n=0
zL(n) q̂(n̂|gi, s) [v(n̂+ 1, s)− v(n̂, s)], (1)
where q̂(n̂|gi, s) is the probability that n̂ of the other N−1 investors receive positive private signals
conditional on gi and the public signal s. Given investor i’s low bid, n̂ is the number of high bids
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and n̂ + 1 is the total number of positive private signals. The payoff ÛL(s) represents investor i’s
informational rents in the offering. It is strictly positive and is her reservation payoff.
The underwriter must price and allocate the issue so as to minimize ÛL(s). This yields allo-
cations of zL(s) and zH(s), as explained above. Moreover, whenever investors with low bids are
allocated shares, the underwriter must price the offering as high as possible conditional on the
revealed information. This implies that pL(n̂, s) = v(n̂, s) and the IPO is not underpriced when
the offer price is revised downward.
In equilibrium, investors with positive private signals submit high bids. The expected payoff to
an investor i with a private signal gi from submitting a high bid is
ÛH(s) =
N−1∑
n̂=n̄−1
zH(n̂+ 1) q̂(n̂|gi, s) [v(n̂+ 1, s)− pH(n̂+ 1, s)]. (2)
To induce truthful reporting, ÛH(s) must be equal to or exceed the expected payoff ÛL(s) from
falsely bidding low. Therefore, to minimize investors’ rents, the underwriter will price the issue
so that investors with positive signals are indifferent between bidding high and low, which implies
that
ÛH(s) = ÛL(s). (3)
This incentive condition, however, applies when n ≥ n̄ and there is hence n ∈ [n̄, N ] prices to be
solved for. We resolve this indeterminacy by setting pH(n, s) = pH(s), so that pH(s) is determined
uniquely from Eq. (3). Thus, when the offer price is revised upward, the underwriter always prices
the IPO at pH(s). This feature of the model is discussed in Section 3.2 below. It follows from
ÛL(s) > 0 that the IPO is underpriced in expectation when n ≥ n̄.
To establish underpricing, we compare the IPO price pH(s) to the firm’s expected aftermarket
value vH(s) conditional on n ≥ n̄, which is given by
vH(s) =
∑N
n=n̄ q(n|s)v(n, s)∑N
n=n̄ q(n|s)
. (4)
The IPO is underpriced if vH(s) > pH(s). A comparison of vH(s) and pH(s) is, however, com-
plicated by the fact that the latter is solved from Eq. (3). That is, pH(s) is determined from a
conditional allocation-weighted probability distribution, while vH(s) is determined from an uncon-
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ditional equally-weighted probability distribution. The following equivalence result simplifies this
comparison and is useful for the proofs in the Appendix.
Lemma 2 The allocation-weighted expectation over N − 1 private signals conditional on gi is
equivalent to the unconditional expectation over N signals. In other words,
N−1∑
n̂=n̄−1
1
n̂+ 1
q̂(n̂|gi, s) v(n̂+ 1) =
1
N
N∑
n=n̄
q(n|s) v(n)
and
n̄−1∑
n=0
1
N − n
q̂(n|gi, s) v(n) =
q(gi|G)
N
n̄−1∑
n=0
q(n|s) v(n).
Lemma 2 allows ÛH(s) and ÛL(s) to be expressed in the following way:
ÛH(s) =
1
N
N∑
n=n̄
q(n|s) [v(n, s)− pH(s)]
= 1N UH(s) (5)
and
ÛL(s) =
1
N q(gi|G)
n̄−1∑
n=0
q(n|s)
(
1− n
n̄
)
[v(n+ 1, s)− v(n, s)]
= 1N UL(s). (6)
The IPO price pH(s) is now determined from UH = UL, which gives
pH(s) = vH(s)−
UL(s)
QH(s)
, (7)
where QH(s) ≡
∑N
n=n̄ q(n|s) is the probability of an upward revision in the offer price. Since
UL > 0, it follows that vH(s) > pH(s) and the IPO is underpriced.
We have now established that the offering is underpriced when it is allocated only to investors
with positive signals and otherwise priced at its expected aftermarket value. The underpricing
represents a partial adjustment of the offer price to the private information uncovered during the
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book-building process, leaving a profit for investors who submit high bids. As the firm starts
trading at its aftermarket price, the initial return r(s) conditional on an upward revision in the
offer price is given by
r(s) =
vH(s)
pH(s)
− 1. (8)
The expected initial return is thus
Er(s) = r(s) QH(s), (9)
which is the product of the conditional initial return r(s) and the probability QH(s) of an upward
revision, both conditional on the public signal s.
The analysis so far has established that IPOs are expected to be underpriced in order to induce
investors to truthfully report their private information, similar to Benveniste and Spindt (1989).
In the next section, we go beyond this standard argument and examine the relation between the
public information and underpricing.
3 Public information and underpricing
3.1 Pricing in the presence of a public signal
As shown in Eq. (9), the expected initial return Er(s) is the product of the conditional initial
return and the probability that the issue is underpriced. A key contribution of this paper is the
insight that the public signal affects the expected initial return through both r(s) and QH(s), as
discussed next.
Proposition 1 (The incentive effect) The initial return conditional on an upward revision in
the offer price is negatively related to the public signal s, so that r(g) < r(b).
Proposition 1 shows that the conditional initial return is negatively related to the public signal.
To understand this result, which we label the incentive effect, note that the public signal affects
investors’ incentives in three ways. First, because the private and public signals are conditionally
correlated, the probability of a downward offer price revision is lower for a positive than a negative
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public signal. It follows that the likelihood for an investor to receive underpriced shares after falsely
bidding low is lower, as is his expected payoff, when the public signal is good.
Second, the marginal impact of a positive private signal on the firm’s aftermarket value is
declining in the public signal. The payoff to an investor receiving underpriced IPO shares after
reporting falsely is therefore lower for a positive than a negative public signal, reducing the incentive
to bid low. Third, the conditional correlation between the private and public signals implies that
the probability QH(s) of an upward revision in the offer price is higher for a positive than a
negative public signal. This means that the likelihood for an investor reporting truthfully to
receive underpriced shares is higher for a positive public signal. Hence, the expected payoff from
truth-telling is higher and the underwriter can increase the IPO price without jeopardizing the
investor’s incentives to bid high.
The incentive effect holds that the public signal has a negative impact on the expected initial
return through investors’ incentives to truthfully reveal their information. However, as shown in
Eq. (9), the expected initial return is also affected by the public signal through the probability
QH(s) that there is sufficient demand for the issue to be underpriced.
Proposition 2 (The demand effect) The probability that the IPO is underpriced is positively
related to the public signal, i.e., QH(g) > QH(b).
As stated in Proposition 2, the likelihood that the issue is underpriced is higher for a positive
than a negative public signal. This channel, which we label the demand effect, follows directly
from Lemma 1. Specifically, since the public and private signals are conditionally correlated, the
probability of an upward revision in the offer price (so the issue is underpriced) is higher for a
positive public signal.
Through the two channels in our model, public information has both a positive and a negative
impact on the expected underpricing. We next show that the demand effect will dominate as long
as a sufficiently large number of investors participate in the IPO.
Proposition 3 When the number N of investors in the issue is sufficiently large, the demand
effect strictly dominates the incentive effect and the expected initial return is positively related to
the public signal.
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The intuition of Proposition 3 relies on the declining impact of an investor’s private signal on
the firm’s aftermarket value as the number of investors in the issue increases. Specifically, as N
increases, the investor’s potential payoff from falsely bidding low v(n+1, s)−v(n, s) conditional on
an allocation (n < n̄) drops. This decline in informational rents reduces the amount of underpricing
required to induce truthful revelation. Thus, an increase in N decreases the relative importance
of the incentive effect. Once the number of investors in the issue is sufficiently large, the demand
effect strictly dominates the incentive effect. The public signal is then positively related to the
expected underpricing, consistent with extant evidence.
3.2 Discussion of key assumptions
Our model extends the original work by Benveniste and Spindt (1989). By adding a public signal,
we show that public information affects the initial return through two different channels: investors’
incentives to report truthfully and the likelihood of sufficient demand to induce underpricing. While
most of the basic setup is the same as in the original model, we make two major alterations, which
are discussed in this section.
The first alteration is to specify the firm’s aftermarket value as an unbiased expected value
conditional on investors’ private signals and the public signal, consistent with strong-form market
efficiency. This contrasts with the original setup, where the aftermarket value is an additive function
of investors’ private signals.9 By modeling the aftermarket value v(n, s) as a conditional expectation
of firm value, the marginal impact of each private signal on the aftermarket value is decreasing in
the number of investors with positive signals. This specification is necessary for the incentive effect
to hold for an unrestricted set of parameter values, as in Proposition 1 above. It is also necessary
for Proposition 3 to come through.
Our way of modelling the valuation impact of private signals is consistent with the market
microstructure literature, in which investors’ private information is reflected in the stock price
through the trading process (Kyle, 1985). A similar assumption in Chen and Wilhelm (2008) leads
early-stage investors to bid aggressively in the IPO aftermarket, as the value of their information
declines when additional informed investors enter the market. Note also that allowing investors
9In Benveniste and Spindt (1989), each private signal “has an equal (absolute) marginal impact on the stock’s
value” (p.347).
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to trade on their private information in the aftermarket, as in Busaba and Chang (2010), only
strengthens the incentive effect.
The second alteration is to fix one price pH(s) across all underpriced states n ∈ [n̄, N ], in
which the issue is allocated exclusively to investors who submit high bids. Because the amount
of underpricing is determined by the payoff ÛL(s) from falsely submitting a low bid, the state-by-
state underpricing across states n ∈ [n̄, N ] is indeterminate and hence arbitrary. We resolve this
indeterminacy by having the underwriter set the same price pH(s) independently of n ∈ [n̄, N ]. A
similar indeterminacy is present in Benveniste and Spindt (1989) as well. Unlike us, however, they
do not need to specify the exact prices across these states, but only that these are the states in
which the IPO is underpriced.
An alternative approach, which we used in earlier versions of this paper, is to allocate all
underpricing to state n = N combined with allocating shares to low bidders only if all investors
submit low bids (when n = 0). This modelling strategy is supported by an assumption that the
underwriter may allocate the entire issue to one investor (i.e., n̄ = 1). The alternative approach
resembles that used by Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet (2002) in a comparative analysis of various
selling mechanisms for unseasoned shares. We chose the present approach as it is more general,
while still permitting analytical solutions and yielding identical results.
4 Empirical tests of the model
In our model, the public signal has both a positive and a negative effect on the expected underpric-
ing. Prior studies, which show that the initial return increases with the pre-issue market return,
document the combined effect of the two channels. In this paper, we design an empirical testing
strategy which allows us to examine each channel separately.
The incentive effect holds that the public signal affects the expected underpricing through
investors’ incentives to report truthfully. It the context of the literature, it implies that the un-
derpricing associated with a given offer price revision is greater in falling markets than in rising
markets. This empirical prediction is new to the literature and unique to our model. The demand
effect, on the other hand, channels the impact of the public signal through the probability that
the issue is underpriced. It implies that the likelihood of the underwriter underpricing the IPO
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increases with the pre-issue market return.
In the cross-sectional analysis below, we test each of the two channels in our model and show
that the predictability of the initial return to the market return disappears for top-tier underwriters
once we control for the incentive effect. Before presenting the cross-sectional analysis, however, we’ll
first introduce the sample, provide a brief univariate analysis, analyze the probability of completing
the IPO, and verify that partial adjustment exists in our data.
4.1 Sample selection, description and key variables
We start by selecting all 13,462 U.S. IPOs in the period 1970 to 2012 from the Global New Issues
database in Thompson Financial’s SDC. To identify book-built IPOs, we restrict the sample to the
8,825 cases with a positive spread between the high and low filing price. SDC does not report a
filing range prior to 1981, so this restriction effectively eliminates all offerings in the 1970s.
We require the IPO firms to have a filing midpoint of at least $5 per share, be matched with
CRSP and be listed on NYSE, AMEX or Nasdaq. All unit offerings, real estate investment trusts,
financial institutions, American Depository Receipts, and closed-end funds are eliminated. We
further restrict the sample to firms with a founding year in the Field-Ritter founding data set and
a lead underwriter rank in the Ritter underwriter ranking data set, and require the completed
IPOs to trade by the 42nd trading day after the public listing.10 These selection criteria produce a
final sample of 6,301 IPOs filed between 1983 and 2012, of which 5,369 are completed and 932 are
withdrawn.
Table 1 reports the number of cases, initial returns and pre-issue market returns by year. The
initial return is defined as IR1 = p1/p0 − 1, where p1 is the firm’s closing price on the first day
of trading and p0 is the final offer price, winsorized at 200%. In the empirical analysis below, we
use IR1 as a proxy for the underpricing in the IPO.11 The market return (Public) is the return on
the S&P500 index over the 42 trading days preceding the IPO issue date. We select this window
to match the typical registration period in our sample. As shown in column (1), a majority of the
sample firms (58%) file to go public in the 1990s, while 25% file in the 2000s and 17% file in the
1980s.
10The founding year and lead underwriter rank is from Jay Ritter’s web page at the University of Florida.
11In unreported regressions, where we use the first-month return as a proxy for the underpricing, the inferences are
qualitatively unchanged.
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The next four columns of Table 1 present statistics for the 5,369 completed IPOs. As reported
in column (3), the average initial return is 19.7%, with a peak of 67% and 53% in 1999 and 2000,
respectively. Moreover, the average market return preceding the issue is 2.5% (column (4)) and it
is positive for 72% of the IPOs (column (5)). Notice that even in the hot issue year of 1999, one-
quarter of the completed IPOs were preceded by negative market returns. The last four columns of
Table 1 present statistics for the 932 withdrawn IPOs. As shown in column (7), 15% of the IPOs in
our sample are withdrawn. Not surprisingly, the withdrawn IPOs are preceded by a lower market
return of on average 0.9% (column (8)). Yet, the pre-issue market return is positive for as many
as 60% of the withdrawn IPOs (column (9)).
A test of our model requires a measure for the private information uncovered by the underwriter
through the book-building process. We follow Hanley (1993) and rely on the revision in the final
offer price: Revision = p0/pmid − 1, where pmid is the midpoint of the pricing range in the initial
SEC filing (the “filing range”). Some of the decision to revise the offer price may, however, originate
in market-wide information reaching the underwriter during the registration period. We therefore
purge any effect of the stock market return from the offer price revision.
To decide on a model for orthogonalizing Revision and Public, we first examine how investment
banks revise the offer price within and outside of the filing range. Panels A and B of Table 2 show
the frequency distribution in number and percent, respectively, of the price revision, conditional on
the direction and magnitude of Revision. As shown in Panel B, almost half of the IPOs are priced
outside of the range: 25% below the minimum price (column (1)) and 23% above the maximum
price (column (7)). Moreover, another 30% of the IPOs are priced at the filing range endpoints:
14% at the minimum (column (2)) and 16% at the maximum (column (6)). Thus, only 22% of the
IPOs are priced strictly inside the filing range, of which half are not revised at all (11%, column
(4)). As it turns out, the vast majority of IPOs have a $2 wide filing range (midpoint +/-$1) and
the within range price revisions cluster on zero, +/-50 cents, and +/-$1 (the endpoints).
Panel C of Table 2 reports the corresponding conditional mean price revision. The average
value of Revision for IPOs priced above and below the range is +21% and -22%, respectively,
while it is +/-8% for IPOs priced at the filing range endpoints. The fact that 30% of the IPOs are
priced at the endpoints, combined with the much larger revisions for IPOs priced outside of the
range, indicate that within-range price revisions may be determined differently from offer prices set
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outside of the range.
In order to allow for the use of different pricing algorithms for offer prices inside and outside of
the range, we define Private as the residual ε from the following regression:
Revision = α+ β1 ∗ Public+ β2 ∗ Public ∗WithinRange+ β3 ∗WithinRange+ ε. (10)
This specification holds that any information in the price revision beyond that directly at-
tributable to the stock market is private.12 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation of Eq. (10)
generates coefficient estimates of β1=1.01 and β2=-0.84. This suggests that IPOs priced outside of
the filing range tend to be updated one-to-one with the contemporaneous stock-market movement.
In contrast, IPOs priced within the range, where the association between Private and Public is
given by β1 +β2=0.17, are typically left relatively unadjusted for stock-market returns. Panel D of
Table 2 shows the conditional mean of Private across the different categories of price revisions. The
average value of Private is +/-8% for IPOs priced at the filing range endpoints and +23%/-21%
for IPOs priced outside of the filing range.
Wang and Yung (2011) find evidence of more frequent filing of price revisions by reputable
investment banks and suggest that the partial adjustment phenomenon is attributable to the top-
tier underwriters. As discussed in Ljungqvist (2007), this is consistent with the difference in
results found by Cornelli and Goldreich (2001, 2003) and Jenkinson and Jones (2004). The former
examine the order book of a top-tier underwriter and show that more informative bids—limit-order
bids, bids received early, and revised bids—receive greater allocations. Jenkinson and Jones (2004),
however, find no such evidence for the order book of a lower-tier underwriter and suggest that there
are important differences in the informativeness of the order book between top-tier and lower-tier
underwriters.
Since our framework requires informative investor bids, we follow Carter and Manaster (1990)
and split our sample into IPOs where the highest-ranked lead underwriter is a top-tier underwriter
(rank=9) versus a lower-tier underwriter (rank<9). Half of the completed IPOs in our sample have
at least one top-tier lead underwriter, while the remaining sample firms use lead underwriters with
a rank below 9. Given systematic differences in the informativeness of the order book, the incentive
12Although the price revision has been shown to vary with certain offer characteristics, these are known when the
initial filing range is set and do not represent new information in our setting.
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effect should be strongest for the subsample of IPOs sold by top-tier underwriters.13
The offer price revisions in our data are consistent with top-tier underwriters receiving infor-
mative bids and lower-tier underwriters failing to do so. As in Wang and Yung (2011), we find
that the mean and standard deviation of Revision are higher for top-tier underwriters. Moreover,
the distribution of Revision for the top-tier underwriters is almost twice as positively skewed, con-
sistent with investors being rewarded for positive information. As reported in Panel B of Table
2, top-tier underwriters price 29% of the IPOs above the filing range, compared to 16% for the
lower-tier underwriters.
4.2 Univariate analysis
We first examine the relation between the first-day return and the pre-issue market return in the
univariate. Table 4 shows the average initial return (IR1) for the subsample of 4,184 completed
IPOs that are priced outside of, or at the endpoints of, the filing range.14 The IPOs are split by
falling (PublicNEG) and rising (PublicPOS) pre-issue stock markets, where the subscripts NEG
and POS indicate that the variable Public is ≤ 0 and > 0, respectively.
In our model, the investment bank underprices the offering only when there is an upward price
revision, i.e., when n ≥ n̄ investors receive a positive private signal and bid high. To capture
the demand states, the table further separates the issues into positive (PrivatePOS) and negative
(PrivateNEG) private information, where Private is the price revision adjusted for the pre-issue
market return according to Eq. (10) above. The first three columns present the total, while columns
(4)-(6) and (7)-(9) show the subsamples of IPOs sold by top-tier and lower-tier underwriters,
respectively. Variable definitions and data sources are listed in Table 3.
Panel A addresses the incentive effect. Starting with the full sample, the average initial return
is substantially higher when investor demand is high. For example, in column (1), IR1 is 44%
for PrivatePOS and only 4% for PrivateNEG, consistent with underwriters rewarding investors for
private information. Moreover, comparing columns (1) and (3), the average initial return is lower in
13Alternatively, large IPOs may attract more interest from sophisticated institutional investors, increasing the
informativeness of the order book. In our sample, however, the large IPOs always have top-tier lead underwriters.
Our key empirical results are qualitatively unchanged if we split the sample by size rather than underwriter quality.
14In practise, price revisions are discrete and have to be done at least in tick size increments. Even if there is no
private information and Revision is correctly adjusted for the market return, it is unlikely that ε=0 in Eq. (10) for
small price revisions. Thus, we exclude 1,185 strictly within-range price revisions from the univariate comparison.
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falling markets than in rising markets (19% vs. 23%, with p<0.01 for the difference). This positive
correlation between initial returns and market returns is the predictability puzzle that our model
sets out to explain.
The incentive effect, however, implies a negative relation between the conditional initial return
and market return for issues in high demand. As shown in Panel A, this conjecture holds for
PrivatePOS , where IR1 is significantly higher in falling than rising markets (44% vs. 38%, p<0.05).
Panel B of Table 4 addresses the demand effect, which predicts that the likelihood of underpric-
ing increases with the market return. As reported, the fraction of IPOs with positive initial return
(IR1 > 0) is significantly lower in falling markets. For example, 68% of all IPOs are underpriced
in falling markets vs. 78% in rising markets, with p<0.001 for the difference, as predicted.
We next turn to the subsamples based on underwriter quality. As shown in Panel A, the initial
return is positively associated with underwriter rank. For example, when the market return is
positive, the first-day return averages 28% for IPOs sold by top-tier underwriters (column (6)) and
17% for lower-tier underwriters (column (9)).
Focusing on the top-tier underwriters (columns (4) to (6)), the difference in average initial
return across falling and rising markets is significantly negative (-11%, p<0.01) for issues in high
demand, consistent with the incentive effect. Panel B further shows that the fraction of underpriced
IPOs does not vary with market conditions, as if the demand effect is weak. Combined, this suggest
that the conditional initial return—the incentive channel—drives the difference in IR1 for top-tier
underwriters.
For lower-tier underwriters, however, the difference in IR1 across falling and rising markets is
now positive (5%, p<0.05) for issues in high demand. Moreover, the fraction of underpriced IPOs
is somewhat lower for PrivateNEG than for PrivatePOS (91% vs. 94%, p<0.10). Thus, it appears
as if the incentive effect is relatively weak for the lower-tier underwriters, consistent with a less
informative order book.
Finally, Panel C of Table 4 shows the number of observations across the different subsamples
and illustrates the conditional correlation between the private and public signals in our model.
The fraction of IPOs with high demand (PrivatePOS) is significantly higher in rising than falling
markets (54% vs. 38%). Conversely, the fraction of IPOs with low demand (PrivateNEG) is
significantly lower in rising markets (46% vs. 62% for PublicNEG). This pattern, which supports
17
Lemma 1, holds across all underwriter types.
Overall, the univariate statistics in Table 4 are consistent with the empirical implications of our
model. First, while the average initial return and the market return are positively associated in the
sample at large, they are negatively related for IPOs in which the incentive effect is expected to be
strong, i.e., issues in high demand sold by top-tier underwriters. Second, the fraction of IPOs with
a positive initial return is lower when the stock market is falling, as implied by the demand effect.
Third, the likelihood that the final offer price is adjusted upward—tantamount to high investor
demand—is higher when markets are rising, consistent with a conditional correlation between the
private and public signals.
4.3 Withdrawal of the IPO
To empirically test our model, we regress the initial return on the pre-issue market return in various
specifications capturing the implications of the incentive and demand effects. Note first that issuers
may choose to withdraw the IPO when the market return is low (Busaba, Benveniste, and Guo,
2001; Benveniste, Ljungqvist, Wilhelm, and Yu, 2003). The decision to withdraw the IPO leads
to a truncation of the sample of initial returns and the coefficients from an ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression may be biased. To correct for this truncation in the observed underpricing, we
follow Edelen and Kadlec (2005) and use a two-step Heckman (1979) procedure.
This subsection describes the first step of the Heckman prodedure, in which the probability of
completion (versus withdrawal) is estimated. Table 5 reports the coefficient estimates from probit
regressions, where column (1) uses the full sample of 6,301 IPOs and columns (2) and (3) present
the results for the two subsamples defined by underwriter rank.
The explanatory variables are issue and market characteristics that previously have been shown
to affect the withdrawal decision. The first two variables are the pre-issue stock-market return
in rising and falling markets: Public*PublicPOS and Public*PublicNEG, respectively. Moreover,
Underwriter Count is the number of underwriters in the offering, Amount Filed is log of the dollar
value of the issue, and Underwriter Rank is the Carter and Manaster (1990) rank of the highest-
ranked lead underwriter.
The next three variables describe the current state of the IPO markets, measured across all IPOs
over the 42 trading days preceding the issue: Spillover Revision is the average offer price revision
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(Revision) ortogonalized to Public; Spillover IR1 is the average initial return (IR1) ortogonalized
to Public and Spillover Revision; and Spillover Withdrawn is the number of withdrawn IPOs during
the same period. Specifically, we use the residuals from the regressions Revision = α+β∗Public+ε
and IR1 = α+ β1 ∗ Public+ β2 ∗ Spillover Revision+ ε, respectively.
Starting with column (1), the regression results are consistent with prior studies. The likelihood
that the offering is successful decreases with issue size and increases with the number and rank of
underwriters marketing the IPO. The probability of completing the issue also depends on the state
of the IPO markets, where the number of withdrawn IPOs and the first-day return of recent IPOs
both have a negative effect on the completion rate. Controlling for the performance of recent IPOs,
the completion likelihood is further decreasing in the pre-issue stock market return, Public, and it
is more sensitive to the market return in falling than rising markets.
Turning to columns (2) and (3), most of the inferences hold across underwriters of different
quality. The exception is the coefficient for Public*PublicPOS , which is negative and significant
for lower-tier underwriters only. That is, for top-tier underwriters, the completion likelihood is
independent of the pre-issue market return when stock markets are rising.
We use the probit estimates from these first stage regressions to compute the Inverse Mill’s
ratio for each observation. The inclusion of the Inverse Mill’s ratio in the second-step regressions
helps correct for the self-selection in the truncated sample of initial returns.
4.4 Verifying Partial Adjustment to Public Information
Before examining the implications of our model, we first verify that the positive relation between
the initial return and the pre-issue market return found by others also hold in the cross-section for
our sample. Table 6 reports the coefficient estimates from OLS regressions for the initial return,
IR1. The explanatory variables in column (1) are the two main variables of interest, Public and
Private, as well as the Inverse Mill’s ratio from Table 5.
Column (2) adds firm and issue characteristics such as firm age (Age), Underwriter Rank,
Amount Filed, the percent of the offered shares newly issued by the firm (Primary), and dummy
variables indicating that the firm is in the high-tech industry (High Tech), backed by a venture
capital firm (V C), and listed on Nasdaq (Nasdaq). Column (3) further includes Spillover IR1
and Spillover Revision, both capturing the current state of the IPO markets. Finally, columns
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(4) and (5) split the sample by underwriter rank. Standard errors are clustered by Fama-French
49 industry.
As shown in Table 6, the coefficients for Private and Public are positive and statistically highly
significant (p<0.001) in all regression models. The former is consistent with underwriters leaving
money on the table for investors submitting informed bids, as in Benveniste and Spindt (1989)’s
information-based equilibrium. The latter is the puzzle of partial adjustment to public information
that our model sets out to explain.
Note that the Inverse Mill’s ratio is insignificant in columns (2)-(4), when the control variables
are included. This suggests that the truncation caused by withdrawals does not bias the coefficient
estimates in the regular OLS. While not shown here, the coefficient estimates are largely unchanged
when we exclude the Inverse Mill’s ratios from the regressions. Edelen and Kadlec (2005) also report
an insignificant coefficient for the Inverse Mill’s ratio and a significantly positive coefficient for the
market return, indicating that the Heckman correction itself fails to explain the partial adjustment
to public information. Moreover, several of the control variables are significant. The initial return
is increasing in the average initial return and price revision of recent IPOs. Also, for the subsample
of IPOs sold by top-ranked underwriters, the initial return decreases in firm age and tends to be
higher for issuers backed by a venture capitalist.
4.5 Tests of the incentive effect
Having established a positive relation between underpricing and pre-issue market return in our
sample, we next turn to tests of the incentive effect. A central prediction of our model is that,
ceteris paribus, investors require less underpricing to truthfully report their information in rising
markets than in falling markets. We test this prediction by regressing the initial return on our
proxy for private information, separated by negative and positive market returns. Specifically, we
run the following regression:
IR1 = γ + β1Public+ β2Private+ β3Private ∗ PublicPOS + e. (11)
The interaction variable Private∗PublicPOS hence captures the difference in the impact of private
information on the initial return in rising vs. falling markets. Our model predicts that β3 < 0.
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Table 7 reports the coefficient estimates from OLS regressions of Eq. (11) and has a similar
structure as Table 6. Starting with the full sample (columns (1)-(3)), Public and Private again
both generate positive and highly significant (p<0.01) coefficients in all regression specifications,
consistent with partial adjustment. Turning to the interaction term Private*PublicPOS , it enters
with a significantly (p<0.05) negative coefficient in all three regression specifications. As predicted
by our model, the underpricing associated with a given price revision is smaller in rising markets
than in falling markets. In contrast, Sherman (2005) proposes that investors’ opportunity cost of
becoming informed increases with the market return. Her model thus predicts β3 > 0, which is
rejected by our evidence.
As discussed above, the incentive effect requires an informative order book. To the extent that
high-quality underwriters receive more informative bids, the incentive effect should be strongest for
these underwriters. Hence, to exploit potential differences in order book informativeness, columns
(4) and (5) split the sample by underwriter rank.
Importantly, the interaction term Private*PublicPOS generates a negative and highly significant
(p<0.001) coefficient for top-tier underwriters (column (4)). It is as if top-tier underwriters com-
pensate investors more for private information in falling markets than in rising markets, as implied
by the incentive effect. Moreover, the coefficient for Private is higher for IPOs sold by top-tier
than lower-tier underwriters (1.10 vs. 0.40, significantly different at the 1% level). It appears that
investors on average receive higher compensation for their information in issues sold by top-tier
underwriters, consistent with a more informative order book.
Note also that the coefficient for Public becomes insignificant when Private*PublicPOS is in-
cluded in column (4). That is, for the subsample of top-tier underwriters, the positive relation
between the initial return and the market return disappears after controlling for the incentive
effect. Our model is thus able to successfully explain the puzzling partial adjustment to public
information for the subsample of top-tier underwriters, where the order book is held to be most
informative. Cornelli and Goldreich (2003) similarly show that the underwriter, in setting the issue
price, relies on the reaction in investor bids to public information rather than the public information
itself.
Column (5) of Table 7 shows the regression estimation for the subsample of lower-tier un-
derwriters. Here, the initial return increases not only with Public and Private, but also with
21
Private*PublicPOS—something that our model is neither designed to nor able to explain. It is,
however, consistent with Derrien (2005), who shows that both IPO prices and initial returns in-
crease with investor demand during the internet bubble.
In sum, the implications of the incentive effect generated by our model are borne out in the
data: the underpricing associated with an offer price revision tends to be lower when the stock
market drops during the book building period than when it rises. This is consistent with under-
writers adjusting the issue price more in response to investors’ information when publicly available
information is negative. The effect is concentrated to IPOs sold by top-tier underwriters, where
the orderbook has been shown to be more informative—a necessary condition for the information-
based argument by Benveniste and Spindt (1989) to hold. Importantly, when controlling for the
incentive effect, the positive relation between the initial return and the market return disappears
in the subsample of top-tier underwriters, effectively resolving the puzzle of partial adjustment to
public information.
4.6 Tests of the demand effect
For completeness, we also perform tests of the demand effect, which predicts a positive correlation
between the market return and the likelihood that the IPO is underpriced. Table 8 reports the
coefficient estimates from probit regressions for the likelihood that the initial return is positive
(IR1POS). The regression model includes our standard control variables and standard errors are
clustered by Fama-French 49 industry. The first four columns use the full sample of completed
IPOs, while the last two columns separate the IPOs by underwriter rank.
Note first that, consistent with the demand effect, the likelihood that the issue is underpriced
increases with Public and, in columns (2) and (4), with the dummy variable PublicPOS (p<0.001).
Focusing on the last two columns, the coefficient for Public is greater for lower-tier underwriters
than for top-tier underwriters (4.9 vs. 3.2, p<0.001 for the difference), suggesting that the demand
effect is stronger for lower-tier underwriters.
The variable Private also produces a positive and significant coefficient (p<0.001) in all regres-
sion models. That is, the greater the investor demand, the more likely is the issue to be underpriced.
This is consistent with our model, where the offer is underpriced in the high-demand state.
Finally, several of the control variables generate significant coefficients. In the full sample of
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completed IPOs, the likelihood of a positive initial return increases with the mean initial return in
recent IPOs (Spillover IR1) and it is higher for firms listing on Nasdaq. Moreover, the effect of
the number of underwriters in the issue (Underwriter Count) varies with underwriter quality: it
increases the probability that the issue is underpriced for top-tier underwriters and decreases this
probability for lower-tier underwriters.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we demonstrate that partial adjustment to public information is consistent with the
information-based explanation for IPO underpricing proposed by Benveniste and Spindt (1989).
Adding an informative public signal to their framework, we derive a rational Bayesian equilibrium,
in which investors’ private signals are conditionally correlated to the public signal.
In our model, public information is related to IPO underpricing through two channels. The
first is a demand effect: the likelihood that there is sufficient demand for the issue to be under-
priced is higher for a positive public signal. The second channel, which is new to the literature,
is through investors’ incentives to truthfully reveal their information. This incentive effect implies
that investors require higher compensation (more underpricing) when the public signal is negative,
tantamount to a higher conditional initial return.
We test these predictions for a sample of 6,300 IPOs in 1983-2012. As a proxy for private
information, we use the residual from a regression of the offer price revision on the S&P 500
return over the two months leading up to the issue. Consistent with the incentive effect, the
relation between private information and the initial return is greater in falling markets than in
rising markets. This effect is concentrated to issues sold by top-tier investment banks, where the
order book is held to be most informative. Importantly, when we control for the incentive effect,
the positive relation between the initial return and the market return disappears, hence resolving
the puzzling predictability of initial returns.
We also find empirical support for the demand effect: the likelihood that the issue is underpriced
increases in the public market return. While this result is not surprising, it helps complete our
empirical examination of the model.
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A Appendix
The notation for our probabilistic assumptions and Bayes’ rule is as follows:
V = {G = 1, B = 0}
si = {gi, bi}
s = {g, b}
q(gi|G) = q(bi|B) = γ > q(bi|G) = q(gi|B) = (1− γ) (12)
q(g|G) = q(b|B) = µ > q(b|G) = q(g|B) = (1− µ) (13)
q(G) = α q(B) = (1− α)
q(s) = q(s|G)q(G) + q(s|B)q(B).
Assumptions (12) and (13) imply that the signals (si, s) are informative. Hence,
q(G|g) > q(G)
µα
µα+ (1− µ)(1− α)
> α
µ > µα+ (1− µ)(1− α)
(2µ− 1) > (2µ− 1)α
q(g|G) = µ > 1/2,
q(G|g) = q(g|G) q(G)
q(g)
q(B|g) = (1− q(G|g))
q(B|b) = q(g|B) q(B)
q(b)
q(G|b) = (1− q(B|b)),
which holds for all α ∈ (0, 1).
Moreover, the probability of n positive private signals is given by
q(n|G) ∼ Binomial[N, γ]
q(n|B) ∼ Binomial[N, (1− γ)]
q(n|s) = q(n|G) q(G|s) + q(n|B) q(B|s).
Finally the expected aftermarket value v(n, s) is given by
v(n, s) = G× q(G|n, s) = 1× q(n|G)
q(n|s)
q(G|s).
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Proof of Lemma 1.
It follows by Bayes’ rule that
q(gi|g) =
q(gi, g)
q(g)
, (14)
where
q(gi, g) = q(gi, g|G) q(G) + q(gi, g|B) q(B)
= q(gi|G) q(g|G) q(G) + q(gi|B) q(g|B) q(B) (15)
= γµα+ (1− γ)(1− µ)(1− α).
Similarly,
q(g) = q(g|G) q(G) + q(g|B) q(B) = µα+ (1− µ)(1− α) (16)
and hence
q(gi|g) =
γµα+ (1− γ)(1− µ)(1− α)
µα+ (1− µ)(1− α)
. (17)
Since µ > 1/2 and γ > 1/2, it is then immediate that
q(gi|b) =
γ(1− µ)α+ (1− γ)µ(1− α)
(1− µ)α+ µ(1− α)
(18)
and also that
q(gi|g)− q(gi|b) =
α(1− α)(2µ− 1)(2γ − 1)
[µα+ (1− µ)(1− α)][(1− µ)α+ µ(1− α)]
> 0. (19)
It can similarly be shown that q(bi|b) > q(bi|g) if µ > 1/2 and γ > 1/2.
Proof of Lemma 2.
The allocation-weighted expectation of the other N − 1 investors also receiving a positive signal gi
is given by (note that n̄ ≥ 1, hence n̂ ∈ [0, N − 1])
N−1∑
n̂ = n̄−1
1
n̂+ 1
q̂(n̂|gi, s) =
N−1∑
n̄−1
1
n̂+ 1
q̂(n̂|G) q(G|gi, s) +
N−1∑
n̄−1
1
n̂+ 1
q̂(n̂|G) q(B|gi, s), (20)
where
q̂(n̂|G) ∼ Binomial[N − 1, γ]
=
(
N − 1
n̂
)
γn̂(1− γ)(N−1)−n̂
q̂(n̂|B) ∼ Binomial[N − 1, (1− γ)]
=
(
N − 1
n̂
)
(1− γ)n̂γ(N−1)−n̂.
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Equation (20) can be reindexed using n̂ = n− 1, which gives us
N∑
n=n̄
1
n
q̂(n− 1|gi, s). (21)
We need to show that the allocation-weighted expectation given one positive signal gi is equivalent
to the unconditional expectation
N∑
n=n̄
1
n
q̂(n− 1|gi, s) =
1
N
N∑
n=n̄
q(n|s). (22)
Given that
(
N−1
n−1
)
1
n =
(N−1)!
(n−1)![(N−1)−(N−1)]!
1
n =
N !
n!(N−n)!
1
N =
(
N
n
)
1
N we have that
1
n
q̂(n− 1|G) q(G|gi, s) =
1
n
(
N − 1
n− 1
)
γn−1(1− γ)(N−1)−(n−1) q(G|gi) q(G|s)
=
1
N
(
N
n
)
γn(1− γ)N−n q(G|s)
=
1
N
q(n|G) q(G|s). (23)
Hence, equation (22) must hold.
Conversely, given that
(
N−1
n
)
1
N−n =
(N−1)!
n![(N−1)−n]!
1
N−n =
(N−1)!
n![N−(n+1)]!
1
N−n =
N !
n!(N−n)!
1
N , we can
similarly show that
n̄−1∑
n=0
1
N − n
(
1− nn̄
)
q̂(n|gi, s) =
γ
N
n̄−1∑
n=0
(
1− nn̄
)
q(n|s), (24)
which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 1.
The initial return associated with the high-demand state equals
r(s) =
vH(s)
pH(s)
− 1; s ∈ {b, g}, (25)
where
pH(s) = vH(s)−
UL(s)
QH(s)
. (26)
We want to show that r(g) < r(b), or that
vH(g)
pH(g)
<
vH(b)
pH(b)
. (27)
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Let vH(s) =
∑N
n=n̄ q(n|s)v(n,s)∑N
n=n̄ q(n|s)
= λH(s)QH(s) and hence pH(s) =
λH(s)−UL(s)
QH(s)
, and we get
λH(g)
λH(g)− UL(g)
<
λH(b)
λH(b)− UL(b)
λH(b)− UL(b)
λH(b)
<
λH(g)− UL(g)
λH(g)
1− UL(b)
λH(b)
< 1− UL(g)
λH(g)
UL(g)
λH(g)
<
UL(b)
λH(b)
. (28)
Keeping in mind that q(n|s) v(n, s) = q(n|G) q(G|s), we get that
UL(g)
q(G|g)
∑N
n=n̄ q(n|G)
<
UL(b)
q(G|b)
∑N
n=n̄ q(n|G)
(29)
UL(g)
q(G|g)
<
UL(b)
q(G|b)
(30)
q(gi|G)
q(G|g)
n̄−1∑
n=0
(
1− nn̄
)
q(n|g) [v(n+ 1, g)− v(n, g)] < q(gi|G)
q(G|b)
n̄−1∑
n=0
(
1− nn̄
)
q(n|b) [v(n+ 1, b)− v(n, b)]
1
q(G|g)
n̄−1∑
n=0
(
1− nn̄
)
q(n|g) [v(n+ 1, g)− v(n, g)] < 1
q(G|b)
n̄−1∑
n=0
(
1− nn̄
)
q(n|b) [v(n+ 1, b)− v(n, b)]
n̄−1∑
n=0
(
1− nn̄
) [
q(n+ 1|G) q(n|g)q(n+1|g) − q(n|G)
]
<
n̄−1∑
n=0
(
1− nn̄
) [
q(n+ 1|G) q(n|b)q(n+1|b) − q(n|G)
]
n̄−1∑
n=0
(
1− nn̄
) [
q(n+ 1|G) q(n|g)q(n+1|g)
]
<
n̄−1∑
n=0
(
1− nn̄
) [
q(n+ 1|G) q(n|b)q(n+1|b)
]
n̄−1∑
n=0
(
1− nn̄
)
q(n+ 1|G)
[
q(n|g)
q(n+1|g) −
q(n|b)
q(n+1|b)
]
< 0, (31)
which holds if, for all n ∈ [0, N − 1], we have that
q(n+ 1|g)
q(n|g)
>
q(n+ 1|b)
q(n|b)
. (32)
Let Γ = 1−γγ such that
q(n+ 1|s)
q(n|s)
=
(
N
n+1
)(
N
n
) γ(n+1)(1− γ)N−(n+1) q(G|s) + γN−(n+1)(1− γ)(n+1) q(B|s)
γn(1− γ)N−n q(G|s) + γN−n(1− γ)n q(B|s)
=
(
N
n+1
)(
N
n
) ΓN−(n+1) q(G|s) + Γ(n+1) q(B|s)
ΓN−n q(G|s) + Γn q(B|s)
. (33)
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Hence, equation (32) becomes
ΓN−(n+1) q(G|g) + Γ(n+1) q(B|g)
ΓN−n q(G|g) + Γn q(B|g)
>
ΓN−(n+1) q(G|b) + Γ(n+1) q(B|b)
ΓN−n q(G|b) + Γn q(B|b)
(34)
ΓN q(G|g) + Γ2(n+1) q(B|g)
ΓN q(G|g) + Γ2n q(B|g)
>
ΓN q(G|b) + Γ2(n+1) q(B|b)
ΓN q(G|b) + Γ2n q(B|b)
. (35)
Using that
ΓN q(G|s) + Γ2(n+1) q(B|s) + Γ2n q(B|s)− Γ2n q(B|s)
ΓN q(G|s) + Γ2n q(B|s)
= (36)
1 +
Γ2n+2 q(B|s)− Γ2n q(B|s)
ΓN q(G|s) + Γ2n q(B|s)
= (37)
1− (1− Γ
2) Γ2n q(B|s)
ΓN q(G|s) + Γ2n q(B|s)
, (38)
we get
−Γ2n(1− Γ2) q(B|g)
ΓN q(G|g) + Γ2n q(B|g)
> −Γ2n(1− Γ2) q(B|b)
ΓN q(G|b) + Γ2n q(B|b)
(39)
q(B|b)
ΓN q(G|b) + Γ2n q(B|b)
>
q(B|g)
ΓN q(G|g) + Γ2n q(B|g)
(40)
q(B|b) [ΓN q(G|g) + Γ2n q(B|g)] > q(B|g) [ΓN q(G|b) + Γ2n q(B|b)] (41)
ΓN q(G|g) q(B|b) > ΓN q(G|b) q(B|g). (42)
Using that q(G|b) = [1− q(G|g)] and q(B|g) = [1− q(B|b)], we have
ΓN q(G|g) q(B|b) > ΓN [1− q(G|g)][1− q(B|b)] (43)
ΓN q(G|g) q(B|b) > ΓN [1− q(G|g)− q(B|b) + q(G|g) q(B|b)] (44)
ΓN [q(G|g) + q(B|b)− 1] > 0. (45)
As long as ΓN > 0, we have that
q(G|g) + q(B|b) > 1 (46)
q(g|G)q(G)
q(g)
+
q(b|B)q(B)
q(b)
> 1
q(g|G)q(G)q(b) + q(b|B)q(B)q(g) > q(g)q(b)
q(g|G)q(G)q(b) + q(b|B)q(B)q(g) > [q(g|G)q(G) + q(g|B)q(B)]q(b)
q(b|B)q(B)q(g) > q(g|B)q(B)q(b)
q(b|B)q(g) > q(g|B)q(b)
µ[µα+ (1− µ)(1− α)] > (1− µ)[µ(1− α) + (1− µ)α]
µ2α > (1− µ)2α
µ > 1/2. (47)
Thus, for any γ, µ > 1/2, α ∈ (0, 1) and ΓN > 0, we have that r(N, g) < r(N, b).
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Proof of Proposition 2.
By Bayes’ rule it follows that
q(n|s) = q(n|G) q(G|s) + q(n|B) q(B|s).
We need to show that
QH(g) > QH(b) (48)
N∑
n=n̄
q(n|g) >
N∑
n=n̄
q(n|b) (49)
N∑
n=n̄
q(n|G) q(G|g) + q(n|B) q(B|g) >
N∑
n=n̄
q(n|G) q(G|b) + q(n|B) q(B|b)
N∑
n=n̄
q(n|G) q(G|g) +
N∑
n=n̄
q(n|B) (1− q(G|g)) >
N∑
n=n̄
q(n|G) (1− q(B|b)) +
N∑
n=n̄
q(n|B) q(B|b).
Let QG =
∑N
n=n̄ q(n|G) and QB =
∑N
n=n̄ q(n|B), such that
QG q(G|g) +QB [1− q(G|g)] > QG [1− q(B|b)] +QB q(B|b)
[QG −QB] q(G|g) > [QG −QB]− [QG −QB] q(B|b)
[QG −QB] [q(G|g) + q(B|b)] > [QG −QB] , (50)
which holds if q(G|g) + q(B|b) > 1 and QG > QB. We showed that the first part holds if µ > 1/2
in proposition 1. What remains is therefore to show that
N∑
n=n̄
q(n|G) >
N∑
n=n̄
q(n|B) (51)
1−
n̄−1∑
n=0
q(n|G) > 1−
n̄−1∑
n=0
q(n|B)
n̄−1∑
n=0
q(n|B) >
n̄−1∑
n=0
q(n|G). (52)
Equation (52) is the definition of the cumulative distribution function of G first-order stochastically
dominating B for n ∈ [0, N−1], which holds for any γ > (1−γ). Also note that the equality in (52)
is achieved only in (52) for n = N . Hence, (52) holds for any γ > 1/2, which completes the proof.
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Proof of Proposition 3.
The proposition is proved by showing that
lim
N→∞
Er(g)
Er(b)
= lim
N→∞
r(g)
r(b)
QH(g)
QH(b)
> 1. (53)
Assuming that the signals are informative (γ, β > 1/2), taking the limit of (45) implies
lim
N→∞
r(g)
r(b)
= 1. (54)
From (51), it must be that
lim
N→∞
QH(g)
QH(b)
> 1. (55)
The only case where QH(g) = QH(b) would be for QH(g) = QH(g) = 1. This only happens if
n̄ = 0. Hence, (55) must hold, which completes the proof.
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Table 1: Sample Initial IPO Return and Pre-issue Market Return
The table shows the average initial return and pre-issue market return by year for the sample of 6,301 U.S. IPOs
filed in the period 1983 to 2012. The initial return is IR1 = p1/p0 − 1, where p1 is the closing price on the first
trading day and p0 is the offer price, winsorized at 200%. Public is the return on the S&P500 index (S&P500) over
the 42 trading days leading up to the issue. N is the number of observations.
All IPOs Completed IPOs Withdrawn IPOs
IR1 Public % of Public
Year N N Mean Mean % Positive N sample Mean % Positive
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1983 244 243 10.4 1.6 60.5 1 0.4 −3.2 0.0
1984 111 105 6.9 0.8 57.1 6 5.4 0.7 50.0
1985 110 102 5.7 4.0 82.4 8 7.3 5.4 87.5
1986 276 236 14.3 2.8 72.5 40 14.5 1.1 60.0
1987 187 165 12.9 6.1 86.1 22 11.8 2.8 90.9
1988 64 59 5.3 1.1 61.0 5 7.8 0.1 40.0
1989 80 66 7.7 3.2 69.7 14 17.5 3.6 78.6
1990 100 77 10.2 −0.2 55.8 23 23.0 2.2 73.9
1991 240 224 11.9 1.5 60.7 16 6.7 2.2 50.0
1992 354 304 10.5 2.0 65.8 50 14.1 0.9 66.0
1993 441 393 12.8 1.3 76.3 48 10.9 1.0 77.1
1994 369 317 8.9 −0.5 44.2 52 14.1 −0.1 50.0
1995 391 344 21.4 4.9 100.0 47 12.0 4.8 97.9
1996 585 536 16.9 3.9 85.6 49 8.4 4.4 83.7
1997 420 351 15.1 5.1 86.0 69 16.4 5.8 84.1
1998 292 214 25.5 4.9 79.9 78 26.7 1.3 52.6
1999 439 377 66.9 2.6 72.4 62 14.1 2.9 72.6
2000 392 311 52.9 0.1 49.5 81 20.7 −1.8 40.7
2001 135 58 16.3 0.2 48.3 77 57.0 −7.2 15.6
2002 63 49 10.9 −3.7 24.5 14 22.2 −4.5 21.4
2003 55 47 12.3 3.4 100.0 8 14.5 3.5 87.5
2004 143 129 12.5 2.3 68.2 14 9.8 −0.5 21.4
2005 154 134 12.1 1.5 67.9 20 13.0 1.7 80.0
2006 148 124 13.6 2.6 80.6 24 16.2 2.1 70.8
2007 156 132 14.9 1.6 67.4 24 15.4 1.2 54.2
2008 41 17 6.4 −3.2 29.4 24 58.5 −3.2 33.3
2009 43 35 11.3 5.0 97.1 8 18.6 6.5 75.0
2010 90 78 9.4 3.4 71.8 12 13.3 −1.2 41.7
2011 84 69 14.8 1.7 65.2 15 17.9 −0.4 33.3
2012 94 73 16.0 3.9 86.3 21 22.3 0.9 61.9
Total 6 301 5 369 19.7 2.5 72.0 932 14.8 0.9 60.1
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Table 2: Initial Filing Range Statistics
Panel A and B report the frequency and distribution, respectively, of the price revision (Revision), defined as the
offer price relative to the midpoint of the pricing range in the initial SEC filing. Panel C shows the conditional average
price revision in %, while Panel D reports the conditional mean value of our estimate for private information, Private,
defined as the residual ε from the regression Revision = α + β1 ∗ Public + β2 ∗ Public ∗Within + β3 ∗Within + ε,
where Revision is the update in the offer price from the filing range midpoint and Within indicates an offer price
within the filing range. The sample IPOs are allocated according to their price revision: Below range, Within range
(Lowest endpoint (Min), Negative revision (Min<Neg<0), Zero revision (0), Positive revision (0<Pos<Max), and
Highest endpoint (Max)), and Above range. In each panel, the sample is further split by underwriter rank: Top-tier
and Lower-tier indicate that the highest-ranked underwriter has a Carter and Manaster (1990) rank=9 and rank<9,
respectively. The sample consists of 5,369 completed book-built U.S. IPOs filed in 1983-2012 and priced at the
endpoint of, or outside of, the pricing range.
Offer Price: Below Within Pricing Range Above All
Range Min Neg Zero Pos Max Range IPOs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Frequency distribution (N) of Revision
Top-tier 634 334 96 295 99 461 788 2707
Lower-tiers 713 430 210 318 167 391 433 2662
All 1347 764 306 613 266 852 1221 5369
Panel B: Distribution of Revision in %
Top-tier 23% 12% 4% 11% 4% 17% 29% 50%
Lower-tiers 27% 16% 8% 12% 6% 15% 16% 50%
All 25% 14% 6% 11% 5% 16% 23% 100%
Panel C: Conditional average Revision
Top-tier -21.9% -7.7% -3.9% 0.0% 3.8% 7.2% 21.4% 1.4%
Lower-tiers -24.1% -9.2% -4.9% 0.0% 4.5% 8.4% 23.7% -3.0%
All -23.1% -8.5% -4.6% 0.0% 4.2% 7.7% 22.3% -0.8%
Panel D: Conditional average value of Private
Top-tier -19.5% -7.4% -3.8% 0.0% 3.9% 7.3% 22.0% 2.2%
Lower-tiers -21.8% -9.0% -4.7% 0.0% 4.5% 8.3% 24.3% -2.2%
All -20.7% -8.3% -4.5% 0.0% 4.3% 7.8% 22.9% 0.0%
34
Table 3: Variable Definitions
The table shows the names and definitions of, and sources for, the variables used in the analysis. Ken French and
Jay Ritter refer to their respective data webpages.
Name Definition Sources
A: Variables critical for testing the model
Revision Price revision Revision = p0/pmid − 1, where p0 is the final offer price
and pmid is the midpoint of the pricing range in the initial SEC filing.
SDC
IR1 Initial return IR1 = p1/p0 − 1, where p1 is the firm’s closing price on
the first trading day and p0 is the final offer price, winsorized at 200%.
Proxy for underpricing.
SDC, CRSP
Public Return on the S&P500 index over the 42 trading days preceding the
issue. Proxy for public information during the book building period.
CRSP
Private Proxy for private information. The residual from the regression
Revision = α + β1 ∗ Public + β2 ∗ Public ∗Within + β3 ∗Within + ε,
where Within indicates an offer price within the filing range.
SDC, CRSP
POS, NEG The subscripts POS and NEG indicate a dummy taking the value of one
if the variable is positive and non-positive, respectively.
Top-tier Dummy indicating that at least one of the underwriters has a Carter
and Manaster (1990) rank of 9.
SDC
Lower-tier Dummy indicating that all of the underwriters has a Carter and Man-
aster (1990) rank below 9.
SDC
B: Control variables
Age Log of firm age since the founding year. Jay Ritter
Primary Percentage of shares sold in IPO as primary share (new issue). SDC
Amount Filed Log of total $ amount filed in the IPO. SDC
Spillover Revision Price revision spillover. The average Revision, orthogonalized to Public,
for all IPOs in the 42 trading days prior to listing.
SDC, CRSP
Spillover IR1 Initial return spillover. The average IR1, orthogonalized to Spillover
Revision and Public, for all IPOs in the 42 trading days prior to listing.
SDC, CRSP
Spillover Withdrawn The number of withdrawn IPOs in the 42 trading days prior to listing. SDC
Underwriter Count Log of the number of underwriters in the IPO. SDC
High Tech Indicator that the IPO firm is a high-technology firm. SDC
VC Indicator that the IPO firm is backed by a venture capital firm. SDC
Nasdaq Indicator that the IPO firm is listed on Nasdaq. CRSP
Within Indicator that the IPO was priced Within the Initial Filing Range. CRSP
C: Clustering Variables
FF49id Fama-French 49 industry indices definitions. Ken French
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Table 5: Probability of Completing the IPO
The table reports the coefficient estimates from a probit regression for the probability that a filed IPO is completed
vs. withdrawn prior to the issue. Column (1) uses the full sample, while columns (2) and (3) split the sample by
underwriter rank: Top-tier and Lower-tier indicate that the highest-ranked underwriter has a Carter and Manaster
(1990) rank=9 and rank<9, respectively. All variables are defined in Table 3. The z-scores (in parenthesis) use
standard errors clustered by Fama-French 49 industry. *, **, *** and **** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%,
and 0.1% level, respectively. The sample consists of 6,301 book-built U.S. IPOs filed in the period 1983 to 2012.
Sample: All IPOs Top-tier Underwriter Lower-tier Underwriter
(1) (2) (3)
Public*PublicPOS −2.141∗∗∗ −0.320 −3.466∗∗∗∗
(−2.97) (−0.36) (−3.39)
Public*PublicNEG 10.244
∗∗∗∗ 8.534∗∗∗∗ 11.900∗∗∗∗
(11.80) (7.38) (8.77)
Underwriter Count 1.007∗∗∗∗ 1.244∗∗∗∗ 0.680∗∗∗∗
(16.20) (12.89) (10.11)
Amount Filed −0.503∗∗∗∗ −0.475∗∗∗∗ −0.535∗∗∗∗
(−15.20) (−10.23) (−9.22)
Underwriter Rank 0.067∗∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗∗
(4.83) (8.29)
Spillover IR1 −1.721∗∗∗∗ −1.679∗∗∗∗ −1.824∗∗∗∗
(−14.98) (−7.35) (−7.37)
Spillover PU −0.279 −0.344 −0.148
(−0.72) (−0.66) (−0.28)
Spillover WD −0.054∗∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗∗ −0.051∗∗∗∗
(−10.27) (−6.82) (−7.72)
Constant 8.913∗∗∗∗ 8.641∗∗∗∗ 9.428∗∗∗∗
(15.40) (10.31) (10.05)
Observations 6,301 3,071 3,230
of which completed 5,369 2,707 2,662
of which withdrawn 932 364 568
Pseudo R2 0.225 0.288 0.191
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Table 6: Tests for Partial Adjustment to Public Information
The table reports the coefficient estimates from OLS regressions for the initial return (IR1). Public is the
return on the S&P500 index over the 42 trading days leading up to the issue. Private is the residual ε from
the regression Revision = α + β1 ∗ Public + β2 ∗ Public ∗ Within + β3 ∗ Within + ε, where Revision is the
update in the offer price from the filing range midpoint and Within indicates an offer price within the filing
range. The Inverse Mill’s ratio is from the probit regressions in Table 5. All variables are defined in Table 3.
The t-statistics (in parenthesis) use standard errors clustered by Fama-French 49 industry. *, **, *** and ****
denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, respectively. The sample consist of 6,301 book-built
U.S. IPOs between 1983-2012.
All IPOs Top-tier Lower-tier
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Public 0.392∗∗∗∗ 0.425∗∗∗∗ 0.427∗∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗ 0.655∗∗∗∗
(4.56) (4.86) (5.10) (2.73) (5.42)
Private 0.882∗∗∗∗ 0.822∗∗∗∗ 0.711∗∗∗∗ 0.892∗∗∗∗ 0.510∗∗∗∗
(9.66) (12.27) (14.99) (16.04) (14.28)
Age −0.033∗∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗∗ −0.007
(−3.70) (−4.42) (−5.17) (−1.26)
Spillover IR1 0.792∗∗∗∗ 0.779∗∗∗∗ 0.616∗∗∗∗
(9.39) (9.46) (5.02)
Spillover PU 0.621∗∗∗∗ 0.558∗∗∗∗ 0.616∗∗∗∗
(7.21) (5.78) (4.19)
High Tech 0.065∗∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.030∗ 0.008
(4.55) (2.03) (1.68) (0.74)
Underwriter Rank 0.013∗∗∗ 0.001 0.003
(2.91) (0.21) (0.93)
Primary 0.001 0.008 0.023 −0.048
(0.03) (0.37) (1.05) (−0.76)
Amount Filed 0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.002
(0.38) (−0.66) (−0.30) (−0.61)
VC 0.039∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ −0.002
(3.16) (2.81) (3.27) (−0.24)
NASDAQ 0.034∗∗∗∗ 0.021∗ 0.025∗ −0.009
(3.56) (2.00) (1.90) (−0.57)
Inverse Mill’s Ratio −0.056∗∗ 0.006 −0.013 −0.050 0.084∗∗∗
(−2.55) (0.28) (−0.61) (−1.55) (2.74)
Constant 0.199∗∗∗∗ 0.069 0.205∗∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗
(8.65) (1.20) (5.49) (4.08) (2.69)
Observations 5369 5369 5369 2707 2662
Adjusted R2 0.187 0.220 0.334 0.391 0.204
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Table 7: Tests for the Incentive Effect
The table reports the coefficient estimates from OLS regressions for the initial return (IR1).
Public is the return on the S&P500 index over the 42 trading days leading up to the is-
sue. PublicPOS is a dummy for Public > 0. Private is the residual ε from the regression
Revision = α+ β1 ∗ Public+ β2 ∗ Public ∗Within+ β3 ∗Within+ ε, where Revision is the update
in the offer price from the filing range midpoint and Within indicates an offer price within the filing
range. The Inverse Mill’s ratio is from the probit regressions reported in Table 5. All variables are
defined in Table 3. The t-statistics (in parenthesis) use standard errors clustered by Fama-French 49
industry. *, **, *** and **** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, respectively.
The sample consist of 6,301 book-built U.S. IPOs between 1983-2012.
Full sample Top-tier Lower-tier
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Public 0.636∗∗∗∗ 0.597∗∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ 0.267 0.686∗∗∗
(3.74) (3.85) (3.11) (1.43) (3.14)
Private 1.066∗∗∗∗ 1.011∗∗∗∗ 0.770∗∗∗∗ 1.095∗∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗∗∗
(7.46) (8.98) (13.21) (13.12) (9.27)
Private*PublicPOS −0.240∗∗∗ −0.245∗∗∗∗ −0.078∗∗ −0.265∗∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗
(−3.22) (−3.53) (−2.57) (−4.16) (3.17)
PublicPOS −0.035∗∗ −0.025∗ −0.002 0.010 0.000
(−2.19) (−1.93) (−0.12) (0.51) (0.02)
Age −0.033∗∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗∗ −0.006
(−3.69) (−4.39) (−5.08) (−1.20)
Spillover IR1 0.788∗∗∗∗ 0.770∗∗∗∗ 0.624∗∗∗∗
(9.40) (9.47) (4.96)
Spillover PU 0.617∗∗∗∗ 0.539∗∗∗∗ 0.623∗∗∗∗
(7.24) (5.65) (4.18)
High Tech 0.066∗∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.031∗ 0.007
(4.61) (2.07) (1.71) (0.64)
Underwriter Rank 0.012∗∗∗ 0.001 0.003
(2.95) (0.19) (0.91)
Primary 0.001 0.008 0.026 −0.047
(0.05) (0.39) (1.19) (−0.74)
Amount Filed 0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(0.38) (−0.67) (−0.29) (−0.51)
VC 0.039∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ −0.002
(3.21) (2.83) (3.34) (−0.23)
NASDAQ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.021∗ 0.025∗ −0.007
(3.52) (1.98) (1.95) (−0.47)
Inverse Mill’s Ratio −0.060∗∗ 0.002 −0.013 −0.052 0.083∗∗∗
(−2.60) (0.08) (−0.64) (−1.59) (2.72)
Constant 0.220∗∗∗∗ 0.088 0.206∗∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗
(8.27) (1.51) (4.90) (3.50) (2.60)
Observations 5369 5369 5369 2707 2662
Adjusted R2 0.190 0.223 0.334 0.393 0.205
39
Table 8: Tests for the Demand Effect
The table reports the coefficient estimates from probit regressions for the likelihood that the initial re-
turn is positive (IR1POS). Public is the return on the S&P500 index over the 42 trading days leading
up to the issue. PublicPOS is a dummy for Public > 0. Private is the residual ε from the regression
Revision = α + β1 ∗ Public + β2 ∗ Public ∗Within + β3 ∗Within + ε, where Revision is the update in the offer
price from the filing range midpoint and Within indicates an offer price within the filing range. Columns (1)-(4)
use the full sample, while columns (5) and (6) split the sample by underwriter rank: Top-tier and Lower-tier
indicate that the highest-ranked underwriter has a Carter and Manaster (1990) rank=9 and rank<9, respectively.
All variables are defined in Table 3. The z-scores (in parenthesis) use standard errors clustered by Fama-French 49
industry. *, **, *** and **** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, respectively. The sample
consist of 5,369 completed book-built U.S. IPOs between 1983-2012.
All IPOs Top-tier Lower-tier
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Public 3.858∗∗∗∗ 3.887∗∗∗∗ 3.199∗∗∗∗ 4.881∗∗∗∗
(7.66) (7.90) (4.00) (8.74)
PublicPOS 0.264
∗∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗∗
(4.51) (4.85)
Private 3.181∗∗∗∗ 3.134∗∗∗∗ 3.216∗∗∗∗ 3.177∗∗∗∗ 3.724∗∗∗∗ 2.766∗∗∗∗
(23.04) (23.15) (24.02) (23.84) (19.13) (13.01)
Age 0.001 −0.001 −0.006 0.011
(0.07) (−0.05) (−0.20) (0.38)
Underwriter Count 0.013 0.020 0.103∗∗ −0.092∗∗
(0.52) (0.81) (2.52) (−2.51)
Spillover IR1 0.510∗∗∗ 0.521∗∗∗ 0.230 0.836∗∗
(2.78) (3.07) (1.04) (2.39)
Spillover PU −0.393 −0.477∗∗ −0.509∗ −0.092
(−1.63) (−2.06) (−1.66) (−0.20)
High Tech 0.030 0.032 0.062 −0.004
(0.52) (0.56) (0.83) (−0.05)
Primary −0.060 −0.049 −0.017 −0.186
(−0.51) (−0.42) (−0.13) (−0.89)
Amount Filed −0.026∗∗ −0.025∗∗ −0.027∗ −0.002
(−2.02) (−2.00) (−1.83) (−0.16)
VC 0.040 0.036 0.086 0.025
(0.86) (0.77) (1.54) (0.31)
NASDAQ 0.097∗∗ 0.100∗∗ 0.031 0.167∗∗∗
(2.28) (2.32) (0.51) (2.75)
Constant 0.713∗∗∗∗ 0.612∗∗∗∗ 1.095∗∗∗∗ 0.964∗∗∗∗ 0.962∗∗∗ 0.827∗∗∗
(19.07) (12.91) (4.26) (3.70) (2.77) (2.63)
Observations 5369 5369 5369 5369 2707 2662
Pseudo R2 0.125 0.118 0.131 0.125 0.167 0.104
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